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ABSTRACT
Controversy exists regarding the processes involved in creative thinking with the Remote
Associates Test (RAT) and the Compound Remote Associates Test (CRAT). We report three
experiments that aimed to shed light on the component processes underpinning CRAT
performance by using the mere presence of task-irrelevant sound as a key theoretical
tool. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that CRAT performance was impaired relative to a
quiet condition by the presence of sequences of changing letters and tones,
respectively. In both experiments a non-changing sound (a repeated letter or a
repeated tone) produced no disruption relative to quiet. Experiment 3 established that
additional disruption was engendered by having to ignore meaningful speech as
compared to meaningless speech. These experiments demonstrate that both semantic
activation and subvocalisation are important determinants of successful creative
thinking with CRAT problems. We suggest that semantic activation underpins
solution-generation processes whereas subvocalisation underpins solution-evaluation
processes.
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Research on human thinking in the field of problem
solving has produced accounts that specify numer-
ous component cognitive processes that, when
engaged, may facilitate or thwart the coming-to-
mind of a solution (Goldstein & Levin, 1987;
Newell & Simon, 1972; Weisberg, 2015). For
example, nonconscious, implicit processes of
spreading activation within semantic memory can
lead to activation converging on a problem solution
(Ohlsson, 2011). Attentional control processes (e.g.
as measured by working memory capacity; WMC),
however, can have opposing effects on problem
solving (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). On the one hand a
high level of attentional control can facilitate a
narrow search through the problem space, but on
the other hand too much attentional control can
impair problem solving if the solution requires a
less constrained, broader search. Narrow searches
can result in the production of a dominant response
that is incorrect and yield a failure (impasse) and
unless attentional control can then be used to
inhibit the inappropriate response candidate, acces-
sing the problem solution is hindered (Wiley &
Jarosz, 2012).
Multi-component accounts of problem solving
arise in microcosm in the context of work on crea-
tive problem solving. Many of the component pro-
cesses underpinning creative problem solving can
be observed using laboratory-based tasks such as
the compound remote associates test (CRAT;
Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b). The CRAT is a
variant of the older remote associates test (RAT;
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not
altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT John E. Marsh jemarsh@uclan.ac.uk School of Psychology, Darwin Building, Marsh Lane, University of Central Lancashire,
Preston, PR1 2HE, UK
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2021.1900201.
JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2021.1900201
Mednick, 1962) and both are amongst the most fre-
quent and influential tasks used to assess creative
problem solving in historical studies (e.g. Ansburg,
2000; Arden et al., 2010; Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2003b; Dallob & Dominowski, 1993; Mednick, 1962;
Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Smith & Blankenship,
1989) and in contemporary research (e.g. Davelaar,
2015; Howe et al., 2016; Olteţeanu et al., 2018;
Salvi et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2012; Smith et al.,
2013; Wu & Chen, 2017). In the current study we
present CRAT problems in the presence of concur-
rent task-irrelevant sound and use their distraction
susceptibility profiles as a function of task-irrelevant
sound parameters (i.e. acoustic variability, Beaman &
Jones, 1997; and meaningfulness, Marsh et al.,
2009), to glimpse the component processes under-
lying their solution.
The conceptual antecedent of the CRAT, the RAT,
was originally developed to determine creative
thought that was independent of any domain-
specific knowledge (Mednick, 1962). For each RAT
problem, participants are presented with three see-
mingly unrelated cue-words (e.g. same, tennis,
head) and requested to produce as a solution a
fourth word that meaningfully links or mediates the
three cue-words (in this case the fourth word would
be “match”). This solution word may be associated
with one or more of the cue-words through semantic
association (tennismatch), synonymy (same =match)
or compounding (matchhead). In contrast to the RAT,
the CRAT (e.g. Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b)
involves problems for which the semantic association
between the cue-words (e.g. cake, swiss, cottage) and
the solution word (i.e. cheese) is restricted to com-
pound words or phrases, with the solution word
acting as either a prefix (cheese-cake) or a suffix
(swiss-cheese, cottage-cheese) to the cue-words.
Forging new associations between unrelated con-
cepts in the way that is tapped by RAT and CRAT pro-
blems is often thought to be reflective of the
processes underpinning the genesis of original,
useful and adaptive ideas to meet specified task-
requirements (Martindale, 1989).
In the present research we opted to use CRAT
problems as they have advantages for research on
creative cognition over RAT problems, including
the existence of normative data on solution rates
and solution times (e.g. Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2003b), which enables the generation of problem
sets that vary in difficulty according to established
parameters. It was also advantageous in the
present research that CRAT problems only require
the identification of a solution word that forms com-
pound words or phrases with the cue-words (and
not the arguably different processes that underpin
associative processing, polysemic processing and
compounding). Arguably, then, the use of CRAT pro-
blems may, to our advantage, restrict the set of pro-
cesses under investigation. In addition, CRAT
problems can more easily be constructed to yield
unambiguous solutions than RAT items (cf.
Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b). Nevertheless,
since RAT problems do involve compounding and
are sufficiently alike to CRAT problems in terms of
requiring generation and testing of solutions, we
discuss the body of work undertaken using RAT pro-
blems where relevant for our current investigation.
The component processes involved in
solving CRAT and RAT problems
In terms of the component solution processes
involved in solving CRAT and RAT problems, phe-
nomenological reports from participants tackling
such items (e.g. Salvi et al., 2016) suggest that
they are often solved through a process of insight,
which involves non-conscious, implicit thinking
that gives rise to a sudden and clear realisation of
a likely solution (i.e. an “Aha!” experience or
“Eureka!” Moment; e.g. Bowden & Beeman, 1998;
Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b). These flashes of
insight that arise from largely tacit processes may
follow a period of impasse (a feeling of being
stuck) whereby previous, repeated attempts at dis-
covering a solution have proved unsuccessful
(Bowden et al., 2005; Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2003a). While it has been debated (e.g. Cranford &
Moss, 2012) whether an insight response necessarily
requires a standard “insight sequence” (i.e. problem
presentation→ repeated failure→ impasse→ incu-
bation → restructuring → Aha! + solution; Bowden
et al., 2005; Ohlsson, 1992), the reliable correlation
that is observed between CRAT/RAT performance
and measures of creativity (Datta, 1964; Mednick,
1962) and performance on “classic” insight pro-
blems (Dallob & Dominowski, 1993; Huang et al.,
2012; Schooler & Melcher, 1995), suggests that
CRAT and RAT problems share at least some pro-
cesses and characteristics with other tasks that are
used to study creative problem solving.
It should be noted, however, that there is also
evidence from participants’ phenomenological
reports that CRAT and RAT problems may be
solved by a more analytic process (e.g. Salvi et al.,
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2016), which involves conscious, explicit thinking
that takes the solver closer to a solution in an incre-
mental, step-by-step manner (see also Ball &
Stevens, 2009; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004). In addition,
it is also possible that the solution to CRAT and RAT
problems may at times involve a mix of both con-
scious analysis and non-conscious insight (Barr
et al., 2015; for theoretical arguments concerning
the interplay between implicit and explicit pro-
cesses in creative problem solving see Barr, 2018;
Gilhooly et al., 2015; Sowden et al., 2015; Weisberg,
2015, 2018).
If we accept the growing evidence that CRAT and
RAT problems can be solved either via implicit,
insight processes or explicit, analytic processes
(and potentially sometimes a combination of both)
then this raises deeper questions regarding the
specific underlying nature of these key processes.
Indeed, evidence implicates the involvement of a
wide range of underpinning cognitive mechanisms
in the production of solutions to CRAT and RAT pro-
blems, including lexical-semantic, associative oper-
ations (e.g. Marko et al., 2019; Mednick, 1962),
working memory processes (e.g. Ball & Stevens,
2009; Chein et al., 2010; Threadgold et al., 2019)
and executive functions (e.g. Storm et al., 2011).
If such a variety of fundamental processes indeed
underpin CRAT and RAT performance, then it should
be possible to interrogate these processes separ-
ately through empirical manipulations. To this end,
in the current study we investigate how CRAT per-
formance is affected by the mere presence of task-
irrelevant sound comprising different acoustic and
semantic properties. Much is known about the
nature of focal task processing that is disrupted by
different properties of task-irrelevant sound
(Beaman & Jones, 1997; Jones & Tremblay, 2000;
Jones et al., 2012; Marsh et al., 2008, 2009). For
example, only tasks that are underpinned by subvo-
cal serial rehearsal are susceptible to disruption via
the acoustic, changing-state properties of task-irre-
levant sound (Beaman & Jones, 1997), tasks that
require search of semantic memory, such as cat-
egory fluency, are particularly impaired by the
meaning of task-irrelevant sound (e.g. comprehensi-
ble against incomprehensible speech; Jones et al.,
2012), and task-irrelevant sound regardless of its
meaningfulness, does not impair executive pro-
cesses (Jones et al., 2012; Morris & Jones, 1990).
Thus, auditory distraction may be a key theoretical
tool offering a window on the component processes
underpinning successful CRAT performance.
Associative, semantic processes as a
determinant of CRAT and RAT performance
Given that the RAT was modelled on the premise
that creative ideas are realised through novel com-
binations of remotely associated elements, it is not
surprising that numerous studies focus on associat-
ive, semantic or lexical-semantic processing as a
determinant of effective CRAT and RAT performance
(e.g. Davelaar, 2015; Kenett et al., 2018; Kounios &
Beeman, 2009; Marko et al., 2019; Marupaka et al.,
2012; Mednick, 1962; Smith et al., 2012). Such
studies have revealed that individuals who are
better able to solve RAT problems have more inter-
connected, flexible and robust lexical-semantic and
associative networks that facilitate the spread of
activation throughout these networks (Kenett
et al., 2014; Kenett et al., 2018). We return to the
role of associative and semantic process in yielding
CRAT and RAT solutions in Experiment 3.
Retrieval and rehearsal processes as
determinants of CRAT and RAT performance
The importance of verbally-mediated working
memory processes in CRAT solutions has been
reported in a number of studies (Ball & Stevens,
2009; Chein & Weisberg, 2014). For example, Chein
and Weisberg (2014) found that measures of verbal
working memory capacity (i.e. operation span) and
attentional control (i.e. anti-saccade ability)
explained unique variance in overall CRAT solution
rates aswell as in solution rates for problems that par-
ticipants self-reported as being solved via insight, but
not those that were solved via analysis. Chein and
Weisberg also showed that a visuo-spatial working
memory capacity measure (symmetry span),
although being weakly correlated with overall CRAT
solution rates and solution rates for CRAT problems
solved via insight, nevertheless failed to explain any
unique variance once shared variance with verbal
working memory capacity was accounted for (see
also Lee et al., 2014; Lee & Therriault, 2013). This
suggests that domain-specific measures of working
memory capacity may be exclusively associated
with verbally-mediated creative problem-solving
performance as measured by CRAT and RAT pro-
blems. However, given that working memory
capacity tasks likely tap many component processes
(e.g. updating, monitoring, shifting and inhibition;
Miyake et al., 2000), its relationship with CRAT and
RAT performance is arguably not very informative.
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Of relevance to the current investigation is the
fact that working memory span is dependent on
covert retrieval and rehearsal. For example, the
version of working memory span that is referred
to as “operation span” (OSPAN; Turner & Engle,
1989) involves interleaving to-be-recalled words or
letters with simple to-be-solved mathematical
equations (the processing phase). The OSPAN
score is based upon the number of words/letters
that can be recalled in the correct sequence. It is
thought that individuals covertly retrieve and
rehearse the to-be-recalled items throughout the
task, including during the processing phases (e.g.
McCabe, 2008). Such covert retrieval and rehearsal
might entail refreshing (Barrouillet et al., 2004),
mental search (Cowan, 1992) or subvocal rehearsal
(Baddeley, 1986). It is possible, therefore, that the
efficiency of covert rehearsal may explain the associ-
ation between verbal working memory capacity and
performance with CRAT and RAT problems.
In support of this latter view, numerous studies
have shown that preventing subvocalisation can
impair performance on tasks involving working
memory (Murray, 1968), and problem solving
(Wallace et al., 2017; for reviews, see Alderson-Day
& Fernyhough, 2015; Winsler et al., 2009). Pertinent
to the current study is Ball and Stevens’s (2009)
finding that concurrent articulatory suppression
(repeating the sequence 1 through 6 at one item
per second) reduced performance accuracy for easy
and difficult CRAT problems relative to a control con-
dition. However, instructing participants to verbalise
all thoughts (i.e. to “think aloud”) impaired perform-
ance for easy CRAT items but facilitated performance
for difficult CRAT items relative to a control condition.
This general impairment of CRAT performance by
articulatory suppression suggests that solving CRAT
problemsmay benefit from inner-speech production.
Similarly, limiting opportunities for subvocalisa-
tion by presenting task-irrelevant sounds also
hampers concurrent CRAT performance (Ball et al.,
2018; Threadgold et al., 2019). For example, Thread-
gold et al. (2019) demonstrated that meaningless
irrelevant sound (Spanish vocal music presented to
monolingual English-speaking participants; Exper-
iment 1) or non-vocal, instrumental music (Exper-
iment 2) impaired solution accuracy for CRAT
problems relative to quiet. Furthermore, sound
with little acoustic variation (i.e. library noise) pro-
duced no impact relative to quiet, while an upbeat
song with lyrics produced disruption relative to
quiet and library noise (Experiment 3). Threadgold
et al. (2019) concluded that the disruptive impact
of task-irrelevant sound on CRAT performance was
a consequence of the presence of changing-state
irrelevant sound conflicting with subvocal processes
required for CRAT problem solving – an interference-
by-process (Jones & Tremblay, 2000) – yet the
authors did not include the more typical device of
comparing a repeated single sound (e.g. letter or
tone; steady-state) with an acoustically varying
sequence of sounds (e.g. different letters or tones;
changing-state). Therefore, the necessary checks
have not yet been undertaken to support the
notion that the disruption to CRAT performance by
task-irrelevant sound is attributable to an interfer-
ence-by-process.
The increased disruption produced by changing-
state as compared with steady-state sounds has
been coined the “changing-state effect” and is the
key empirical referent of the “irrelevant-sound
effect” in the context of short-term memory for
serial order (Jones et al., 1992). Here, the mere pres-
ence of a changing sequence of speech (different
verbal tokens) or non-speech sounds (sequence of
tones of different frequency) impairs serial recall of
visual-verbal items (e.g. Jones & Macken, 1993).
That it is the acoustic properties, rather than the
phonological or post-categorical properties of to-
be-ignored sound that determines disruption of
serial recall is well-known. For example, to-be-
ignored narrative that is incomprehensible to par-
ticipants produces as much disruption as narrative
presented in the participant’s mother tongue
(Jones et al., 1990; Marsh et al., 2009, supplementary
experiment), indicating that the semanticity of the
sound does not contribute additional disruption.
The interference-by-process view holds that the
pre-attentive processing of the serial order of
changes within sound, as a by-product of the audi-
tory-streaming process (Bregman, 1990), clashes
with the deliberate serial rehearsal process that sup-
ports the ordered retention and recall of the visual
memoranda (Jones & Tremblay, 2000). Specifically,
the irrelevant order cues compete with the subvo-
cal, motoric process ([inner-]speech planning)
responsible for maintaining the to-be-remembered
items in a sequence. On the interference-by-
process account, both the influence of changing-
state sound and articulatory suppression on serial
recall performance are attributable to their impact
on the speech-planning process: articulatory sup-
pression blocks the speech-planning process while
changing-state sound impairs its operation via
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threatening to assume the control of action of the
process. Finding a changing-state effect in the
context of CRAT problem solving would lend cre-
dence to the notion that verbal working memory
– and particularly subvocalisation – is involved in
CRAT performance (Ball & Stevens, 2009; Chein &
Weisberg, 2014; Threadgold et al., 2019).
Support for the proposal that themanifestation of
a changing-state effect indicates that subvocalisa-
tion is necessary for facilitating performance on a
focal task has been gleaned from studies of task sen-
sitivity. Only tasks that call for the seriation of infor-
mation or for which rote rehearsal provides an
efficient strategy are disrupted by the presence of
task-irrelevant sound conveying changing-state
properties (Baddeley & Salamé, 1986; Beaman &
Jones, 1997, 1998; Boyle & Coltheart, 1996; Burani
et al., 1991; Farley et al., 2007; Gisselgård et al.,
2007; Henson et al., 2003; Jones & Macken, 1993;
Richardson, 1984; Salamé & Baddeley, 1990). Argu-
ably the most convincing demonstration of this
has been via the comparison of two tasks that
share many characteristics (e.g. items, rate of presen-
tation, list length) but whose contents can be tested
in one of two ways. For example, presenting all but
one digit from a well-known set of digits in a
random order and asking participants to report the
missing digit can be completed largely without ser-
iation. This is demonstrated by the fact that perform-
ance on the task survives articulatory suppression
(Beaman & Jones, 1997) and is immune to the chan-
ging-state effect (Beaman & Jones, 1997; Jones &
Macken, 1993). However, presenting a post-list
probe and requesting the participant to report the
item that followed it on the list is dependent on
serial recall, as is evident by the susceptibility of
the task to disruption via articulatory suppression
(Beaman & Jones, 1997) and the changing-state
effect (Beaman & Jones, 1997).
This task-process sensitivity is a key line of evi-
dence against alternative accounts of auditory dis-
traction that suppose the disruption produced by
changing-state sound is due to the passive proces-
sing of that sound reducing the overall level of
resource available for any task that is attentionally
demanding (e.g. Bell et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2019;
Cowan, 1995; see also Neath, 2000).
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to establish more con-
vincingly than hitherto (e.g. Threadgold et al., 2019)
whether changing-state properties of sound impair
CRAT performance. To this end, we contrasted per-
formance in a quiet condition to performance in a
steady-state (repeated letter) and changing-state
(changing letters) condition. We expected to
observe a changing-state effect whereby CRAT per-
formance is lower for problems tackled in a chan-
ging-state as compared to a steady-state condition.
If the presence of a changing-state effect can be pre-
sented as ipso facto evidence that performance of the
focal task is underpinned by subvocal-motor proces-
sing (Beaman & Jones, 1997; Jones & Macken, 1993),
then we can infer that such processing underpins
performance for at least some CRAT problems.
As noted earlier, it is widely held that CRAT pro-
blems can be solved either via sudden insight pro-
cesses or via step-by-step, analytic processes
(Bowden et al., 2005; Danek et al., 2016). Given that
the use of subvocalisation, which is susceptible to
disruption from changing-state sound, might
suggest a step-by-step analytic strategy associated
with CRAT problem solving, we also requested that
a subset of participants give “feeling-of-insight”
ratings for correctly solved problems. Using the
prompt detailed by Chein and Weisberg (2014), par-
ticipants were asked whether they felt their solution
to each problem was obtained through a step-by-
step analytic process or a sudden coming-to-mind
of the solution (i.e. an “Aha!”moment). If it is analytic
solutions that are specifically impaired by changing-
state sound, then we expected to observe more self-
reported insight solutions than analytic solutions in
the changing-state condition as compared to the
quiet and steady-state conditions.
Method
Participants
Participants were 48 undergraduate students (34
female; Mage = 23.85 years, SDage = 5.32) at the Uni-
versity of Central Lancashire, UK, all reporting
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal
hearing, who took part in the experiment in return
for course credit. From the total of 48 participants,
24 were randomly selected and asked to report
their solution strategy (16 female; Mage = 25.50
years, SDage = 5.67), with the remaining 24 not
being asked to report their solution strategy (18
female; Mage = 22.08 years, SDage = 4.47). All partici-
pants were native English speakers. The research
protocol was approved by the Psychology and
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Social Work Ethics Committee of the University of
Central Lancashire.
Design and materials
The experiment employed a 3 × 2 within-partici-
pants design, with Sound (Quiet vs. Steady-state
speech vs. Changing-state speech) and CRAT
problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult) as the factors.
Irrelevant sound. The irrelevant sound was either
steady-state speech or changing-state speech. The
steady-state speech comprised a single repeated
letter that was sampled from the following set of
10 letters: A B C G J K L M Q S. The changing-state
speech comprised a sequence of letters sampled
from the same 10 letters. To prepare the irrelevant
sound these 10 letters were spoken in an even-
pitch female voice and recorded using Audacity
Software with a 16-bit resolution at a sampling
rate of 48 kHz. Each letter was edited to be
250 ms in spoken duration. Ten 30 s steady-state
sequences were generated that consisted of 50 rep-
etitions of the same letter. In addition, 19 changing-
state sequences were constructed that consisted of
pseudo-random presentations of letters drawn from
the 10-letter set. Within these sequences, each of
the 10 letters was sampled once before any given
letter was sampled again from the set. A further con-
straint was that no given letter was presented twice
in succession within the sequence. Within the chan-
ging-state sequences, each letter was sampled five
times throughout the 30 s sequence duration. For
both the steady-state and changing-state
sequences, a 350 ms silent inter-stimulus-interval
was presented between letters.
Compound Remote Associate Tasks. For this
experiment CRAT problems were selected over RAT
problems as for the latter, associative relatedness,
synonymy and compounding involve the unavoid-
able complication of being processed by different
cognitive systems (Weiland et al., 2014; Wu & Chen,
2017; but see Marko et al., 2019). Fifty-seven CRAT
items were selected from the normative set of pro-
blems provided by Bowden and Jung-Beeman
(2003b), with all of the chosen problems being
solved on average within 30 s. Problems, including
solutions, were chosen on the basis of having no
word overlap and were screened for their appropri-
ateness in UK English. Consistent with previous
studies (Ball & Stevens, 2009; Kizilirmak et al.,
2018), the chosen problems were then divided
using a median split based on solution rates, into a
set of easy CRAT items (n = 30; mean solution rate:
M = .68, SD = .16; mean solution time: M = 8.18 s,
SD = 2.6) and a set of difficult CRAT items (n = 27;
mean solution rate: M = .27, SD = .13; mean solution
times: M = 11.9 s, SD = 2.9).
Using the programme “Match” (Van Casteren &
Davis, 2007), the set of 57 CRAT problems were
divided into three groups of 19 items that were
matched for solution rate (Set 1: M = .49, SD = .26;
Set 2: M = .48, SD = .27; Set 3: M = .48, SD = .26) and
solution time (s) (Set 1: M = 9.98, SD = 3.56; Set 2:
M = 10.13, SD = 3.34; Set 3: M = 9.61, SD = 3.34),
with each being comprised of 10 easy and 9
difficult items. A one-way ANOVA confirmed no sig-
nificant differences between normative solution
rates (p = .985) and solution times (p = .893) for
the three sets of problems. Table 1 provides the
mean solution rates and mean solution times (s)
for the “difficult” and “easy” CRAT problems within
each of the three matched sets.
Self-reported solution strategies. A subset of 24
participants (randomly allocated to the self-report
condition) were asked to report on their solution
strategy after providing a response to each CRAT
problem. It was emphasised to participants that
most problems could be solved either via an analy-
sis strategy or through sudden insight. For each
solved item participants were asked to indicate on
a four-point scale if their answer was derived com-
pletely by analysis, partially by analysis, partially by
insight or completely by insight (cf. Chein & Weis-
berg, 2014). Following Chein and Weisberg (2014),
on producing their solution participants were to
press the appropriately numbered key (1, 2, 3 or 4)
to choose one of four solution strategies: Complete
Strategy (key 1), Partial Strategy (key 2), Partial
Insight (key 3) and Complete Insight (key 4). Partici-
pants were reminded that there were no right or
wrong answers for the solution strategy and were
Table 1. Mean normative solution rates and solution times
(s), with standard deviations in parentheses, for the easy
and difficult CRAT problems within each of the three
matched sets of problems used in Experiment 1.













Set 1 .69 (.17) .28 (.15) 7.86 (2.93) 12.34 (2.67)
Set 2 .69 (.16) .25 (.14) 8.60 (2.34) 11.83 (3.58)
Set 3 .67 (.17) .26 (.12) 7.78 (2.70) 11.65 (2.83)
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provided with the brief reminder summary as
follows:
1. Complete Strategy: When you thought of the
word, at first you did not know whether it was
the answer, but after thinking about it strategically
(for example, trying to combine the single word
with each of the three problem words) you
figured out that it was the answer.
2. Partial Strategy: You did not immediately know the
word was the answer, but you did not have to think
about it much either. For example, after figuring out
how the solution went with the first two stimulus
words, you realized that it was the solution.
3. Partial Insight: You had a weaker feeling of
insight (not as strong as a rating of 4): you felt
that the word you thought of might have been
the answer, but it was not as obvious as “Of
course!” You might have had to check the solution
with one of the words to make sure it was correct.
4. Complete Insight: As soon as you thought of
the word you knew that it was the answer; the
solution word came with a feeling that it was
correct (“It popped into my head”; “Of course!”;“I
had an Aha!”).
Half of the participants received a scale in which
completely analytic solutions were rated as 1 and
completely insightful solutions were rated as 4,
while the other half of participants received a
reverse version of the scale.
Procedure
Each participant provided written informed consent
prior to taking part in the experiment. Participants
completed the task individually on a laptop compu-
ter, with headphones attached. The allocation of
CRAT groups was counter-balanced across partici-
pants. The task-irrelevant sound conditionswere pre-
sented pseudo-randomly with the constraint being
that no more than two consecutive problems were
paired with the same sound condition. For steady-
state trials, a sequence entailing repetition of a
single letter was chosen pseudo-randomly from the
10 steady-state sequences with the exception that
each repeated-letter sequence was sampled across
all steady-state trials an approximately equal
number of times and was not repeated across con-
secutive steady-state trials (even if quiet and chan-
ging-state trials intervened). For changing-state
trials, a random sequence was chosen from the 19
changing-state sequences. Task-irrelevant, to-be-
ignored sound was presented over Sennheiser HD-
202 headphones at approximately 65–70 dB(A).
Participants were provided with instructions to
ignore the background sound and were assured
that they would not be asked anything about it
later. They were introduced to CRAT problems,
and an example CRAT item was presented along
with its answer. To ensure familiarity with the task
and computer programme, participants completed
three additional practice problems, not drawn
from the experimental set of 57 CRAT items,
before undertaking the experimental problems.
Each participant was permitted up to 30 s to
attempt to solve each CRAT problem, and they
were asked to press the space bar on identifying
the answer to reveal a text field in which to insert
their answer before pressing the “enter” key. Partici-
pants were then presented with three fixation
crosses on the screen for 1 s, with each cross
being replaced by one word from the three-word
problem. Participants could not go back to the
same problem, or revise their answer, once they
had entered a response. Cue-words were presented
in 30-point Times New Roman font, and for each
problem all three cue-words were presented simul-
taneously along the same horizontal plane.
Participants were allocated randomly to the strat-
egy-report or no-strategy-report conditions. For
those providing a solution-strategy rating, on com-
pleting each problem the participants were asked
to indicate on a four-point scale whether their
response was derived more by insight or analysis.
The experiment was executed on a PC running an
E-Prime 2.0 programme (Psychology Software Tools,
Sharpsburg, PA, USA) that controlled stimulus presen-
tation and recorded participant responses. On com-
pleting the experiment, each participant received a
written debrief and was thanked for their time.
Results
Supplementary materials and results, including data
analysis scripts, can be found here: https://
uclandata.uclan.ac.uk/274/.
Solution rates were analysed bymeans of general-
ised linear mixed effects (glme) models, using the
“glmer” function from the lme4 package (Bates
et al., 2015) and the binomial family, within the R
environment for statistical computing (R Core Team,
2015). CRAT problem difficulty and sound conditions
were coded as fixed factors and specified using the
function “contr.sdif” from the MASS package
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(Venables & Ripley, 2002). Our general approach was
to include a maximal random effects structure (Barr
et al., 2013), with random intercept and slopes for
all the fixed effects for participants, and random inter-
cept and random slope for the sound conditions for
items, and specify 10000 iterationswith the optimiser
“bobyqa” for glme models. If a model failed to con-
verge or there were zero and/or perfectly correlated
terms in the random structure (indicating data overfi-
tting), we systematically trimmed the model starting
with items and then participants, by first removing
correlations and then interactions. If a model still
failed to converge and/or overfitted the data, we
removed each random slope. The p values were esti-
mated using the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al.,
2017). Fixed effect estimations are summarised in
Table 2.
Self-reported solution strategies scores on the
four-point scale were standardised so that “1”
always indicated an analytic solution, and “4”
always indicated an insight solution. These strategies
were treated as ordinal responses and analysed with
cumulative link mixed (clm) modelling in R, using the
“clmm” function from the ordinal package (Christen-
sen, 2015). Difficulty and sound conditions were
specified as fixed factors using the default con-
tr.treatment and using as baseline the Steady-State
Sound condition for Experiment 1, and the Meaning-
less Sound condition for Experiment 3. We used this
sound conditions as baseline to allow us to perform
theoretically meaningful contrasts and have results
easily comparable with the analyses on the solution
rates. Similar to the analysis of solution rates, the
models initially included a maximal random effects
structure (Barr et al., 2013), with a random intercept
and random slopes (CRAT problem difficulty and
sound) per participants and random intercept and
slope for sound conditions for items. If a model
failed to converge or had correlations in the
random structure equal to zero or one, we pruned
the random structure by first removing correlations,
interactions, and then slopes. The significance of all
effects was assessed using the “summary”
command, with the default p-values based on the
Wald statistic. If any interaction reached significance,
post hoc comparisons of estimated marginal means
with Tukey adjustment were performed
with the emmeans package (Lenth et al., 2018) in
R. The model results are shown in Table 3.




Factor b SE Z Sign.
Intercept −0.538 0.116 −4.636 0.000 ***
Hard – Easy −0.637 0.113 −5.651 0.000 ***
Steady-State – Quiet −0.089 0.101 −0.880 0.379
Changing-State –
Steady-State
−0.535 0.105 −5.082 0.000 ***
(Hard – Easy) ×
(Steady-State –
Quiet)
−0.290 0.202 −1.434 0.152
(Hard – Easy) ×
(Changing-State –
Steady-State)
0.050 0.210 0.240 0.810
Experiment 2
Solution Rate
Factor b SE Z Sign.
Intercept −0.752 0.115 −6.538 0.000 ***
Hard – Easy −0.926 0.102 −9.115 0.000 ***
Steady-State – Quiet −0.050 0.120 −0.415 0.678
Changing-State –
Steady-State
−0.528 0.125 −4.213 0.000 ***
(Hard – Easy) ×
(Steady-State –
Quiet)
0.265 0.240 1.108 0.268
(Hard – Easy) ×
(Changing-State –
Steady-State)
−0.046 0.250 −0.184 0.854
Experiment 3
Solution Rate
Factor b SE Z Sign.
Intercept −0.811 0.149 −5.435 0.000 ***
Hard – Easy −1.228 0.190 −6.454 0.000 ***
Meaningless – Quiet −0.410 0.131 −3.125 0.002 **
Meaningful –
Meaningless
−0.337 0.140 −2.402 0.016 *
(Hard – Easy) ×
(Meaningless –
Quiet)
−0.494 0.262 −1.881 0.060 .
(Hard – Easy) ×
(Meaningful –
Meaningless)
−0.011 0.281 −0.040 0.968
Table 3. Cumulative link mixed effects models for
Experiments 1 and 3.
Experiment 1
Self-Reported Solution Strategies
Factor b SE Z Sign.
Factor
Difficult 0.125 0.425 0.294 0.769
Quiet 0.522 0.310 1.681 0.093 .
Changing-State −0.111 0.547 −0.202 0.840
Difficult:Quiet −0.598 0.527 −1.135 0.256
Difficult:Changing-State −0.227 0.738 −0.308 0.758
Experiment 3
Self-Reported Solution Strategies
Factor b SE Z Sign.
Factor
Difficult −0.876 0.406 −2.157 0.031 **
Quiet −0.027 0.260 −0.104 0.917
Meaningful −0.169 0.281 −0.603 0.546
Difficult: Quiet 0.152 0.535 0.284 0.777
Difficult: Meaningful 1.202 0.525 2.289 0.022 **
Note: Easy CRAT problems and Steady-State (Experiment 1) or Mean-
ingless (Experiment 3) sound conditions are the reference levels.
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Solution rates
Figure 1 displays themean solution rates according to
each level of Sound and each level of CRAT problem
difficulty. As can be seen, the Changing-state speech
condition resulted in fewer correct responses in com-
parison to either the Steady-state speech or Quiet
conditions. In addition, solution rates for Easy CRAT
problems were higher than for Difficult CRAT pro-
blems, but problem difficulty did not appear to mod-
erate the effect of Sound on CRAT performance.
The final generalised linear mixed effects model
for Experiment 1 reached convergence with random
intercept for each item, and random intercept, slope
for CRAT problem difficulty and their correlation for
each participant. The analysis revealed a significant
main effect of CRAT problem difficulty. As expected,
solution rates were significantly higher for the Easy
problems (M = .45, SE = .03) in comparison to the
Difficult problems (M = .32, SE = .03). In addition, sig-
nificantly more problems were solved in the Steady-
state speech condition (M = .42, SE = .03) in compari-
son to the Changing-state speech condition (M = .31,
SE = .03). There was no significant difference between
the number of problems solved in the Quiet (M = .43,
SE = .03) and the Steady-state speech conditions
(M = .42, SE = .03). There was also no significant
CRAT problem difficulty × Sound interaction.
Self-Reported solution strategies
The final model for Experiment 1 included a random
intercept for items and a random structurewith both
fixed effects and their interaction for participants.
The self-reported scores for solution strategy
were collated for CRAT problems that had been
solved correctly. The analysis indicated that the
self-reported solution strategy was not impacted
by any of the experimental conditions. There was
no significant main effect of CRAT problem
difficulty and Sound conditions did not differ from
each other. In addition, the CRAT problem
difficulty × Sound interaction was not significant.
The percentage of participants self-reporting the
four different solution strategies for a correct sol-
ution can be seen in Table 4. The mean percentage
of problems self-reported as solved by Insight
(“Aha!”) was greater than the percentage self-
reported by Strategy. If it can be assumed that the
“Complete Insight” and “Complete Strategy” self-
reports can be dichotomised, then participants
reported their correct solution being accompanied
by an “Aha!” (Complete Insight) response more fre-
quently than not (Complete Strategy). Self-reports
of “Aha!” were less frequent than that reported by
Danek et al. in the context of classical insight
problem solving tasks (2016; 51.9%) and that of
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004, p. 56%, Experiment 1)
who used the CRAT, but comparable with that
reported from the CRAT by Webb et al. (2016, p.
30.66%, Experiment 1). However, caution should be
exercised when drawing these comparison due to
methodological differences in design, problems
adopted and measurement scales. Consistent with
previous findings (e.g. Kizilirmak et al., 2018) the fre-
quency with which participants reported a Complete
Insight, “Aha!” experience, over Complete Strategy
was not influenced by CRAT problem difficulty.
Figure 1. Mean solution rates for Experiment 1 according to Sound condition (Quiet, Steady-state speech and Changing-state
speech) and CRAT problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult). Error bars represent the within-participant standard errors of themean.
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Discussion
Experiment 1 compared CRAT performance in a
quiet condition to performance in task-irrelevant,
steady-state and task-irrelevant, changing-state
sound conditions. The key finding was a changing-
state effect: significantly more CRAT problems
were solved in the steady-state condition relative
to the changing-state condition. As expected, a sig-
nificant difference in solution rates also emerged for
easy versus difficult CRAT problems and this pattern
was unaffected by the presence of sound. The
finding that task-irrelevant, changing-state sound
impairs CRAT problem-solving performance regard-
less of problem difficulty coheres with the finding
that articulatory suppression equally impairs easy
and difficult CRAT problems (Ball & Stevens, 2009;
Threadgold et al., 2019). Contrary to our hypothesis,
however, the presence of task-irrelevant, changing-
state sound did not increase self-reported ratings of
insight solutions relative to analytic solutions.
The presence of a changing-state effect is typi-
cally presented as ipso facto evidence that a task is
underpinned by subvocal motor processing
(Beaman & Jones, 1997). This view has been
shaped by its task-specific nature with a host of
non-serial tasks (e.g. perceptual [Burani et al.,
1991], lexical [Stokes & Arnell, 2012] and executive
[Jones et al., 2012; Morris & Jones, 1990]) all failing
to demonstrate a changing-state effect or disrup-
tion from task-irrelevant, changing-state sound. On
this assumption, Experiment 1 appears to provide
convincing evidence that at least the solving of
some CRAT problems is underpinned, or facilitated,
by subvocal processing (cf. Ball & Stevens, 2009;
Threadgold et al., 2019).
We also note that the failure to find a specific
reduction in self-reported analytic solutions to
CRAT problems in the presence of changing-state
sound undermines the assumption that analytic
strategies (which may involve subvocalisation) are
peculiarly disrupted by acoustical variation.
However, it should be noted that whether solutions
to CRAT problems demonstrate the standard charac-
teristics of insight problem solving has been ques-
tioned. For example, using a think-aloud technique,
Cranford and Moss (2012) found that participants
often report an “Aha!” experience in the absence of
other components of the insight sequence, such as
impasse. In addition, Weisberg (2015) has suggested
routes to insight that are analytically-based,
suggesting that self-report measures of insight pro-
cessing may have debatable diagnosticity.
Experiment 2
Prior to more detailed interpretation of the results of
Experiment 1 we sought to address two issues that
could potentially undermine our putative account
of the data. The first issue is the outside possibility
that the effects we observed were driven by the
Table 4. (a) Percentage of each self-reported strategy for correctly solved problems as a function of Sound condition (Quiet,
Steady-state speech and Changing-state speech) and CRAT problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult); and (b) Percentage of each
self-reported strategy for correctly solved problems as a function of Sound condition (Quiet, Steady-state speech and
Changing-state speech) and collapsed across CRAT problem difficulty. Within-participant standard error of the means
are presented in parentheses.

















Quiet 19.32 (6.33) 13.79 (4.26) 27.15 (5.03) 39.74 (6.08) 19.79 (6.77) 22.90 (5.51) 25.23 (6.07) 32.08 (7.311)
Steady-
State
20.59 (5.43) 20.40 (4.52) 26.68 (5.67) 32.33 (7.14) 21.98 (7.25) 20.08 (6.08) 28.41 (7.14) 29.52 (8.33)
Changing-
state
19.3 (6.48) 26.28 (6.54) 27.62 (5.74) 26.76 (6.61) 20.16 (7.85) 34.29 (8.29) 17.78 (4.53) 27.78 (8.51)









Quiet 19.32 (5.36) 17.84 (4.16) 25.60 (4.48) 37.24 (6.05)
Steady-
State
20.42 (5.01) 19.63 (3.77) 28.12 (5.63) 31.83 (6.45)
Changing-
state
18.61 (5.37) 29.0 (5.62) 23.93 (4.04) 28.45 (6.26)
*Note: Three participants in the Steady-state and Difficult condition, 3 participants in the Changing-state and Difficult condition and 1 participant in
the Changing-state and Easy condition were removed due to not recording correct responses in those condition, thus the means for the Steady-
state and Difficult condition and the Changing-state and Difficult condition comprise scores from 21 participants and the means for the Chan-
ging-state and Easy condition comprise scores from 23 participants.
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semantic properties of the task-irrelevant speech.
The second issue concerned the possibility that the
changing-state effect that we observed is attribu-
table to “attentional capture”, rather than interfer-
ence-by-process.
In Experiment 1, we presented letters as the task-
irrelevant sound. One could argue that some letters
are associated with semantic concepts (e.g. A with
“a”, S with “snake”, T with “tea” and so on). If so,
then the impact of changing-state sound that we
observed might be attributable to the semantic
properties of those sounds, although in our
opinion such an explanation is unlikely. Neverthe-
less, in Experiment 2 we sought to replicate concep-
tually the findings of Experiment 1, but this time by
minimising the potential semantic processing of irre-
levant sound by using tones as the auditory material.
Another potential argument is that the changing-
state effect observed in Experiment 1 is attributable
to the presence of multiple tokens that, according to
some accounts (e.g. Bell et al., 2019), might engen-
der attentional capture from the focal CRAT
problem. While we suggest that this is unlikely due
to the insensitivity of non-serial tests such as the
missing-item task to disruption via the changing-
state effect (Jones & Macken, 1993), we nonetheless
sought to reduce this possibility by adopting the
minimum requirement to satisfy the criterion for
changing-state sound: alternating tokens (Jones
et al., 1992). Two alternating tones 5 semitones
apart have been shown to produce an 8% disruption
of serial recall performance relative to a single
repeated tone (Jones et al., 1999) and according to
Bell et al. (2019) constitute a changing-state stimulus
with the lowest probability of capturing attention.
In sum, Experiment 2 was largely a replication of
Experiment 1 but here, participants tackled CRAT
problems in the presence of alternating tones
(changing-state), repeated tones (steady-state) or
quiet. The requirement for participants to self-rate
their solution strategies was dropped for Exper-
iment 2, given its failure to distinguish changes in
strategy as a function of acoustic variation within
the task-irrelevant sound in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants
Thirty-six undergraduate students (18 female; Mage
= 23.5 years, SDage = 5.3) at the University of
Central Lancashire participated in the experiment
in return for course credit. All participants reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal
hearing and were native English speakers. The
research protocol was approved by the Psychology
and Social Work Ethics Committee at the University
of Central Lancashire. Participants had not pre-
viously taken part in Experiment 1.
Design, materials and procedure
The design was identical to Experiment 1, with the
exception that Steady-state tones and Changing-
state tones were adopted for the sound conditions.
The Steady-state tone took the form of a single,
repeated sine-tone, whereas the Changing-state
tones comprised two alternating sine-tones with a 5-
semitone separation. The to-be-solved CRAT problems
were identical to those described in Experiment 1. The
procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that
described for Experiment 1, with the exception that
participantswerenot asked to self-report their solution
strategy upon solving each problem.
To-be-ignored sounds. Two sine-tones (A4 [440 Hz]
and E4 [329.628 Hz]) five semitones apart, were gen-
erated with Audacity software with 16-bit resolution
at a sampling rate of 48 kHz. The tones were 200 ms
in duration with rise and decay times of 20 ms.
Sequences were created that were 30 s long
wherein tones were separated by 100 ms of silence.
Two steady-state sequences of toneswere generated.
One consisted of repeated presentations of A4 sine-
tones and the other consisted of repeated presenta-
tions of E4 sine-tones. Two changing-state sequences
were constructed for which one sequence started
with the A4 sine-tone and alternated thereafter with
the E4 sine-tone, and the other started with the E4
sine-tone and alternated thereafter with the A4 sine-
tone. Each 30 s sequence comprised 100 tones.
Steady-state and changing-state sequenceswere pre-
sented in a pseudo-randomorderwith the constraints
that the identical sequenceswerenot presentedmore
than twice in succession, no more than two steady-
state or changing-state sequences were presented
in succession and each sequence was presented an
approximately equal number of times across the
testing session.
Results
As in Experiment 1, we analysed solution rates
with glme models in R, using the “glmer” function
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from the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) and the
binomial family, and the self-reported solution
strategies with clm models in R with the “clmm”
function from the ordinal package (Christensen,
2015). The same fixed effects and approach to
random structure were used when modelling.
The results of the models are summarised in
Table 2 and Table 3.
Solution rates
Figure 2 shows the mean solution rates according to
each level of Sound and each level of CRAT problem
difficulty. The data indicate a reduction in CRAT sol-
ution performance for the Changing-state tone con-
dition in comparison to both the Steady-state tone
condition and the Quiet condition.
The model that reached convergence included a
random intercept for item and a random structure
with random intercept, slope for CRAT problem
difficulty and their correlation for participants. The
analysis revealed a significant main effect of CRAT
problem difficulty, with significantly higher solution
rates for the Easy CRAT problems (M = .44, SE = .03)
in comparison to the Difficult CRAT problems (M
= .25, SE = .03). Furthermore, significantly more pro-
blems were solved in the Steady-state tone con-
dition (M = .37, SE = .03) in comparison to the
Changing-state tone condition (M = .27, SE = .04).
There was no significant difference in the solution
rate for problems in the Quiet condition and
Steady-state tone condition. There was also no sig-
nificant CRAT problemdifficulty × Sound interaction.
Discussion
Experiment 2 compared CRAT performance in a
quiet condition to performance in task-irrelevant,
steady-state sound and task-irrelevant, changing-
state sound conditions using non-speech stimuli.
Like Experiment 1, a changing-state effect
emerged whereby CRAT performance was poorer
in the presence of alternating tones compared to
a repeated tone or quiet. Moreover, repeated
tones failed to disrupt performance relative to
quiet. As in Experiment 1, a significant difference
in solution rates was observed for easy versus
difficult CRAT problems and akin to Experiment 1,
this pattern was not modulated by the presence
of sound (cf. Ball & Stevens, 2009; Threadgold
et al., 2019). Given that tones convey no semantic
content (nor phonemes) and alternating tones
have a low probability of capturing attention on
attentional diversion accounts (Bell et al., 2019),
the changing-state effect observed in Experiment
2 rules out a semantic interpretation of the apparent
changing-state effect observed in Experiment 1,
while also suggesting that an attentional capture
explanation is unlikely.
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that changing-
state sound disrupts CRAT performance. Given the
susceptibility of vocalmotor processing to disruption
via the changing-state properties of sound (Jones &
Tremblay, 2000) a facilitatory role of subvocalisation
in CRAT performance in implied. This view is further
supported by the finding that preventing subvocali-
sation impairs CRAT performance (Ball & Stevens,
2009). Furthermore, the finding that changing-state
Figure 2. Mean solution rates for Experiment 2 according to Sound condition (Quiet, Steady-state tone and Changing-state
tones) and CRAT problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult). Error bars represent the within-participant standard errors of the
mean.
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irrelevant sound fails to impair executive processing
(Jones et al., 2012; Morris & Jones, 1990) lends
further support to the view that CRAT performance
is susceptible to disruption due to changing-state
sound interfering with subvocal processes.
Prior explanations of the processes involved in
solving CRAT and RAT problems have been domi-
nated by accounts wherein solutions are produced
via a search through semantic networks (Davelaar,
2015; Kenett et al., 2014; Kenett et al., 2018; Marko
et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2013). At first blush,
however, it seems difficult to envisage how task-irre-
levant sound without rich semantic properties can
disrupt a task underpinned by ostensibly semantic
search (Smith et al., 2013), given that task-irrelevant
sound would not be expected to impact upon the
(possibly implicit) semantic activation processes
required to solve CRAT problems (Davelaar, 2015;
Mednick, 1962; Smith et al., 2013). We note,
however, that the solution of CRAT problems is
often held to require not just a “generate” process
but also a “test” process (see Cranford & Moss,
2012; Smith et al., 2013). The generate component
involves a search within a semantic network that
leads to activation converging on solution candi-
dates, sometimes through executive control (Smith
et al., 2013; but see Marko et al., 2019). The testing
component, on the other hand, involves combining
words within working memory to evaluate whether
a viable solution has been discovered (e.g. Thread-
gold et al., 2019). We therefore suggest that chan-
ging-state sound impairs the subvocalisation
required during the process of testing solutions
but has little or no effect on semantic search.
Although the semantic search process underpin-
ning CRAT performance might be inviolable to the
acoustic, changing-state properties of a task-irrele-
vant sound, we concede that it may be vulnerable
to impairment via the semantic properties of the
task-irrelevant sound. Indeed, a growing body of lit-
erature shows that the semantic properties of task-
irrelevant sound impact on focal task performance
when efficient performance on that task also
requires semantic processing (Beaman, 2004;
Jones et al., 1990; Marsh et al., 2008, 2009; Marsh
& Jones, 2010; Martin et al., 1988; Meng et al.,
2020; Neely & LeCompte, 1999; Sörqvist et al.,
2012). Such evidence suggests that distraction
stems from a conflict between similar, concurrent
semantic processing undertaken for both the focal
task and for the obligatory processing of task-irrele-
vant sound: a semantic interference-by-process.
The instance of semantic interference-by-process
most relevant to the current study is observed in the
context of semantic fluency (Jones et al., 2012;
Marsh et al., 2017), wherein meaningful, but not
meaningless, task-irrelevant sound disrupts retrieval
of category instances from semantic memory in
response to a retrieval cue (e.g. “fruit”). Obvious
similarities exist between the processes used in
solving CRAT problems and semantic fluency
tasks: both are semantic search tasks involving the
use of retrieval cues (Davelaar, 2015). While the
semantic fluency task initially involves the presen-
tation of one cue-word (e.g. “animals”), CRAT pro-
blems entail the presentation of three cue-words.
However, the generation of an item or items (e.g.
cat, lion) in the context of semantic fluency can be
used to search with multiple cues (e.g. “animals”
and “cat”) and locate subcategories or clusters of
items (e.g. pets, zoo animals, feline animals etc.).
While the semantic fluency task requires divergent
thinking and search (i.e. many responses are
required), CRAT problems require divergent think-
ing and search followed by convergent thought,
whereby a single response must be isolated from
activated alternatives. Furthermore, unlike the
semantic fluency task, wherein all items can be
recalled from an accessed semantic cluster, many
competing semantic clusters (e.g. in the case of
polysemic words) may be accessed in the search
for CRAT responses (Davelaar, 2015).
There is good evidence for the obligatory seman-
tic processing of task-irrelevant speech (Röer et al.,
2017; Vachon et al., 2020) that has consequences
for activation within a semantic network, depending
on the type of search process involved. According to
spreading activation accounts, processing a word
activates a concept node that corresponds to its
meaning. In turn, activation spreads to concept
nodes representing other semantically related
words through learned associations. The result is a
localised network of semantic associates. The presen-
tation of a cue therefore leads to activation spreading
throughout semantic networks, activating several
concept nodes that may vie for retrieval. Activation
of concepts within the network due to the obligatory
semantic processing of task-irrelevant speech may
disrupt the flow of activation of linkages between
cue-related items and concepts that facilitate seman-
tic fluency (Jones et al., 2012) and CRAT performance.
Activation within the semantic memory system is
dynamic, changing with each item retrieved. As
such, network activation of concepts from the
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auditory modality may reduce semantic activation,
and thus accessibility of, task-relevant words. One
consequence of task-irrelevant speech activating
the semantic network might be a reduction in the
number of potentially relevant words that can be
retrieved during processing, which will decrease
the likelihood of generating unusual associations or
solutions (Amabile et al., 2005). Since solving CRAT
problems requires such remote associations, CRAT
performance should suffer.
Given that both subvocalisation, which is dis-
rupted by changing-state sound (Jones et al.,
2000), and semantic search, which is disrupted by
meaningful, task-irrelevant sound (Jones et al.,
2012), may influence CRAT problem solving, it
should be possible to observe an additive effect of
the acoustic and semantic properties of sound on
performance. Such an additive effect is not often
observed in the literature, although Oswald et al.
(2000) reported that participants’ comprehension
of sentences was impaired by both meaningful
and meaningless task-irrelevant sound compared
to quiet, with the meaningful relative to meaning-
less speech producing more. Thus, disruption to
comprehension was primarily due to the sounds’
acoustical variation but the disruptive effect was
strengthened by the additional property of the
sound’s semanticity. Further evidence for such addi-
tivity in the disruptive effect of the acoustic and
semantic properties of sound is scarce, with impair-
ments attributable to the acoustic properties of
task-irrelevant sound occurring independently of
its semantic properties (Jones et al., 1990) and like-
wise with disruption attributable to the meaning of
task-irrelevant sound occurring in the absence of
impairment via its acoustic properties (e.g. Marsh
et al., 2008, 2009; Meng et al., 2020).
Experiment 3
The received view is that CRAT problem solving
entails “generate-and-test” processes (Davelaar,
2015; Marko et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2013), as is
the case with many cognitive tasks (Forbus et al.,
1995; Hunt et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2008), particu-
larly those involving word problems (Gupta et al.,
2012). On this account, a local search process
leads to the consideration of response candidates.
When one candidate is selected it is tested against
all the cue-words to verify its validity as a response.
This search-test process is repeated until an accep-
table answer is found (Smith et al., 2013). Moreover,
due to the vast number of words that may be linked
to at least one of the cue-words, search is probabil-
istic rather than exhaustive, which would be too
time-consuming. There is some disagreement con-
cerning whether search is singularly or multiplica-
tively constrained. Using a think-aloud technique
and the RAT, Smith et al. (2013) reported evidence
for the latter. They showed that participants typi-
cally sample from response candidates that are acti-
vated by a single cue-word at a time and that
consecutively produced candidates tend to be asso-
ciatively related to previously considered responses,
suggesting the search process is determined by
spreading activation throughout a localised
network.
The aim of Experiment 3 was to test the hypoth-
esis that the semantic properties of task-irrelevant
sound disrupt CRAT performance. Previous work
suggests the semantic properties of task-irrelevant
sound are obligatorily processed (Röer et al., 2017;
Vachon et al., 2020) and disrupt semantic search,
as revealed by reduced semantic fluency (Jones
et al., 2012; Marsh et al., 2017). Since CRAT perform-
ance draws heavily on semantic search (Mednick,
1962; Smith et al., 2013), we expected the semantic
properties of task-irrelevant sound to have a disrup-
tive effect over and above the effect of its changing-
state properties (as revealed in Experiments 1 and
2). To investigate this, we contrasted performance
in a quiet condition to performance in a meaning-
less sound condition (spectrally-rotated speech)
and a meaningful speech condition.
On the assumption that the acoustic and seman-
tic properties of the task-irrelevant sound affect
different component processes underpinning
CRAT performance, we expected to observe an addi-
tive effect whereby meaningless sound produces
disruption compared to quiet, with an additional
disruption produced by meaningful sound. More-
over, since insight solutions have often been
aligned with convergent semantic activation rather
than step-by-step analytic thinking, we also took
self-report measures for each correct solution. Our
rationale was that self-reported insight solutions
should be lower in the meaningful as compared to
meaningless sound condition and the quiet con-
dition. This is because the obligatory semantic pro-
cessing of meaningful sound (and thus the
activation of concepts within semantic memory)
should disrupt the activation of remote associates
to the cue-words, thereby impairing insight
solutions.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 30 undergraduate students (20
female; Mage = 23.43 years, SDage = 4.38) at the Uni-
versity of Central Lancashire, UK, all reporting
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal
hearing. Participants received course credit for
taking part in the experiment. All participants
were native English speakers, and none had pre-
viously participated in Experiments 1 or 2. The
research protocol was approved by the Psychology
and Social Work Ethics Committee at the University
of Central Lancashire.
Design, materials and procedure
The experiment employed a 3 × 2 within-partici-
pants design, with Sound (Quiet vs. Meaningful
speech versus Meaningless speech) and CRAT
problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult) as the factors.
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 with
the following exceptions: (1) the CRAT problems
were taken from a different source of normed
items; and (2) the Sound conditions were different.
All participants were asked to self-report their sol-
ution strategies using the same four-point scale
that was deployed in Experiment 1.
To-be-ignored sound. The auditory stimuli that
were used as to-be-ignored sound comprised
trivia sentences that were based on (and included)
those used in a previous study by Lev-Ari and
Keysar (2010). The sentences were short statements
such as, “Camels have three eyelids to protect them-
selves from blowing sand”. The sentences were
recorded to at 16-bit resolution at a 22 kHz sampling
rate with Sony Sound Forge Pro 10 software (Sony
Creative Software). The sentences were spoken in
an even-pitched male voice using a Sennheiser ME
65 microphone.
The 20 meaningful sound sequences comprised
the individual sentences concatenated within a
sound file to a duration of 30 s. Each sequence com-
prised a different set of sentences. The 20 meaning-
ful sound sequences were inverted around 2 kHz to
create spectrally-rotated, meaningless versions
(Scott et al., 2009). Spectral rotation involves trans-
forming the high-frequency energy in the signal
into low-frequency energy, and the low frequency
energy into high frequency energy. The acoustic
properties of the spectrally-rotated signal are
regarded as approximately equivalent to the
normal speech signal. For example, pauses
between words and sentences, intonation, and vari-
ation in sound pressure level across time are fairly
equal in spectrally-rotated speech and normal
speech. Spectrally-rotated speech also preserves
some of the phonetic-cue features of normal
speech. In sum, spectrally-rotated and normal
speech possess very similar temporal and spectral
complexity, with the principal difference between
the normal speech signal and the rotated speech
signal relating to its meaning: rotated speech is
incomprehensible, giving the appearance of an
“alien” language.
Compound remote associate tasks. A total of 60
CRAT problems were selected from norms provided
by Sandkühler and Bhattacharya (2008) using the
same method adopted for Experiments 1 and
2. Based on solution accuracy data, these were
divided via a median split into a set of 30 easy
CRAT problems (mean solution rate: M = .65, SD
= .09; mean solution time: M = 8.7 s, SD = 2.3) and
30 difficult CRAT problems (mean solution rate: M
= .34, SD = .07; mean solution time: M = 10.5 s, SD
= 2.9) on the basis of Sandkühler and Bhattacharya’s
(2008) normative data for solution rates and times
for 30 s presentations of problems.
Using the programme “Match” (Van Casteren &
Davis, 2007), the 60 CRAT problems were divided
into three groups of 20 items matched for solution
rate and solution time, each comprising 10 easy
and 10 difficult CRAT problems. There were no sig-
nificant differences between normative solution
rates (p = .997) and solution times (p = .455) for
each of the three sets of CRAT problems. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, an additional three CRAT pro-
blems were selected for use as practice trials to fam-
iliarise participants with the experimental
procedure. Table 5 presents the mean normative
solution rates and solution times for the easy and
difficult CRAT problems within each of the three
matched sets.
Results
Consistent with Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2,
we analysed the data in R with glme models
(“glmer” function from the lme4 package; Bates
et al., 2015) for the solution rates, and clm models
(“clmm” function from the ordinal package,
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Christensen, 2015) for the self-reported solution
strategies. The same Difficulty and Sound conditions
were treated as fixed effects, and the same general
approach adopted to build and then trim the
random structure. As in Experiment 1, post hoc com-
parisons of estimated marginal means with Tukey
adjustment were performed with the emmeans
package (Lenth et al., 2018) in R on any significant
interaction observed in the clm model. The results
of the models are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Solution rates
Figure 3 shows the pattern of findings for the sol-
ution rates in Experiment 3. It is apparent that mean-
ingful speech appeared to be detrimental to CRAT
performance relative to the meaningless speech
and quiet conditions. In addition, the data seem to
indicate that meaningless speech also led to worse
CRAT performance than the quiet condition.
The final glme model that reached convergence
included a random intercept for items, and
random intercept, random slope for CRAT problem
difficulty and their correlation for participants. Con-
sistent with Experiments 1 and 2, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of CRAT problem difficulty, with
significantly higher solution rates for the Easy
CRAT problems (M = .46, SE = .04) in comparison to
the Difficult CRAT problems (M = .23, SE = .03). In
addition, significantly more CRAT problems were
solved in the Quiet condition (M = .41, SE = .04) in
comparison to the Meaningless speech condition
(M = .34, SE = .03). There was also a significant differ-
ence between the type of speech, with significantly
fewer problems solved in the Meaningful speech
condition (M = .28, SE = .03) in comparison to the
Meaningless speech condition (M = .34, SE = .03).
Finally, the analysis revealed a marginal CRAT
problem difficulty × Sound interaction, such that
the effect of CRAT problem difficulty was stronger
in the Meaningless speech condition compared to
the Quiet condition. Given the marginal significance
of the interaction, we are cautious to (over-)inter-
pret this finding.
Self-reported solution strategies
The self-reported solution strategy scores were col-
lated for CRAT problems that had been solved cor-
rectly. The final model for Experiment 3 included a
random intercept for items, and a random structure
with both fixed effects and their interaction for par-
ticipants. Contrary to our prediction, solution strat-
egies did not differ significantly depending on the
Sound conditions. However, CRAT problem
difficulty did give rise to a significant main effect
Table 5. Mean solution rates and solution times (s), with
standard deviations in parentheses, for easy and difficult
CRAT problems within each of the three matched sets of
problems used in Experiment 3.













Set 1 .64 (.09) .34 (.07) 7.86 (2.93) 12.34 (2.67)
Set 2 .65 (.09) .34 (.07) 8.60 (2.34) 11.83 (3.58)
Set 3 .64 (.10) .26 (.12) 7.78 (2.70) 11.65 (2.83)
Figure 3. Mean solution rates for Experiment 3 according to Sound condition (Quiet, Meaningless speech and Meaningful
speech) and CRAT problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult). Error bars represent the within-participant standard errors of the
mean.
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on self-reported solution strategy scores, with Easy
CRAT problems (M = 2.98, SE = .11) resulting in sig-
nificantly higher insight responses compared to
with Difficult CRAT problems (M = 2.81, SE = .17).
There was also a reliable interaction between the
CRAT problem difficulty and the Meaningless and
Meaningful Sound conditions. Pairwise comparisons
revealed that for the Easy CRAT problems, Sound
did not have any effect on self-reported solution
strategy responses, as solution rates did not differ
significantly between the Meaningless speech and
Quiet conditions (b = 0.027, SE = 0.260, z ratio =
0.104, p = .994), and between the Meaningless and
Meaningful speech (b = 0.169, SE = 0.281, z ratio =
0.603, p = .818) conditions. However, for the
difficult CRAT problems, Sound did have an effect
on self-reported solution strategy responses. The
self-reported rating scores significantly differed
between the Meaningless and Meaningful speech
(b =−1.033, SE = 0.442, z ratio =−2.338, p = .051)
conditions, resulting in significantly greater
insight-based ratings for the difficult problems
solved in the Meaningful speech condition. We did
not observe any significant difference in the
Difficult CRAT problems between the Meaningless
speech and Quiet conditions (b =−0.125, SE =
0.437, z ratio =−0.286, p = .956).
The percentage of each self-reported strategy for
correctly solved problems as a function of sound
condition and problem difficulty can be seen in
Table 6. The interesting picture that emerges from
these data is the apparent switch to more analytic
strategies for the difficult CRAT problems. This was
not observed in Experiment 1, nor found previously
(Kizilirmak et al., 2018). Clearly further investigation
is necessary to examine this apparent shift and we
speculate that it is caused by a context effect (the
presence of more complex speech conditions in
Experiment 3 than Experiment 1) or a change to a
different set of CRAT problems from Experiments 1
and 2, to Experiment 3.
Discussion
In Experiment 3 CRAT performance in a quiet con-
dition was compared to performance in a meaning-
less, task-irrelevant sound condition and a
meaningful task-irrelevant sound condition. Consist-
ent with Experiments 1 and 2, CRAT performance
was poorer in the presence of task-irrelevant sound
relative to quiet. However, the key finding of Exper-
iment 3 was that the presence of semanticity within
the task-irrelevant sound augments its disruptive
effect on CRAT performance. Consistent with Exper-
iments 1 and 2, solution rates were greater for easy
versus difficult CRAT problems (cf. Ball & Stevens,
2009; Threadgold et al., 2019). Moreover, like Exper-
iments 1 and 2, the presence of task-irrelevant sound
did not moderate the problem difficulty effect.
The data from Experiment 3 are consistent with
the notion that the semantic properties of task-irre-
levant sound are disruptive to CRAT performance
Table 6. (a) Percentage of each self-reported strategy for correctly solved problems as a function of Sound condition (Quiet,
Meaningless speech and Meaningful speech) and CRAT problem difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult); and (b) Percentage of each self-
reported strategy for correctly solved problems as a function of Sound condition (Quiet, Meaningless speech and
Meaningful speech) and collapsed across CRAT problem difficulty. Within-participant standard error of the means are
presented in parentheses.

















Quiet 6.54 (2.32) 15.59 (4.32) 45.47 (5.59) 32.4 (5.08) 51.19 (8.14) 11.11 (4.36) 16.89 (5.77) 20.81 (6.21)
Meaningless
Speech
8.81 (3.14) 21.75 (6.07) 32.73 (6.05) 36.71 (6.66) 44.36 (9.12) 17.88 (6.67) 14.04 (5.25) 23.72 (7.85)
Meaningful
Speech
7.96 (2.93) 23.98 (4.91) 36.18 (6.80) 31.87 (6.73) 45.45(10.41) 5.38 (3.19) 27.95 (9.01) 21.21 (7.37)









Quiet 22.65 (3.37) 15.30 (3.40) 34.08 (4.06) 27.97 (3.86)
Meaningless
Speech
18.67 (3.45) 20.22 (5.07) 26.62 (4.71) 34.49 (6.22)
Meaningful
Speech
15.93 (3.47) 21.2 (4.40) 32.83 (6.03) 30.05 (6.12)
*Note: The data that are broken down into Easy and Difficult problems are reduced by three participants in the Quiet and Difficult condition, one
participant in the Meaningless speech and Easy condition, four in the Meaningless speech and Difficult condition, one in the Meaningful speech
and Easy condition and eight in the Meaningful speech and Difficult condition. In addition, the overall data are reduced by one participant in the
Meaningful speech condition. These reductions arise because participants did not record a single correct response in the conditions mentioned.
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because they produce a semantic-interference-by-
process. The obligatory semantic processing of
task-irrelevant sound (e.g. Röer et al., 2017; Vachon
et al., 2020) gives rise to a spread of activation in a
semantic network that disrupts the ordinary
spread of semantic activation involved in the loca-
lised search processes underpinning CRAT perform-
ance (Davelaar, 2015; Smith et al., 2013). On the
interference-by-process account, this semantic
interference effect is additional to the disruptive
impact attributable to the acoustic complexity (or
changing-state) properties of the task-irrelevant
sound, which is observed by the disruption pro-
duced by meaningless sound (see Experiments 1
and 2).
That the additional disruption produced by
meaningful, task-irrelevant sound is qualitatively
distinct from meaningless, task-irrelevant sound is
supported by several empirical studies. For
example, meaningless speech (whether reversed
or presented in a language foreign to the partici-
pant) and meaningful speech are equally disruptive
of serial short-term memory (e.g. Jones et al., 1990;
Marsh et al., 2009; Röer et al., 2017). This not only
rules out the notion that the semantic properties
of sound are particularly attentional capturing, but
also supports the idea that it is the semantic charac-
ter of the focal task that determines its susceptibility
to disruption via the semantic properties of the task-
irrelevant sound (Marsh & Jones, 2010; see also
Meng et al., 2020). That meaningful task-irrelevant
sound did not influence self-reported solution
ratings in any predicted way might suggest that
the experience of insight is not diagnostic of the
processes that underpin such insight in problem
solving. However, an alternative account of the
invulnerability of self-reported solution strategy to
the presence of meaningful task-irrelevant sound
is that subvocalisation underpins both analytic and
insight-based solution strategies in different ways,
subvocalisation facilitating solution evaluation pro-
cesses but not generation processes. If this is the
case, then other, non-subvocalisation processes,
could still underpin analytic as compared to
insight solution strategies.
General discussion
In the three experiments reported here we investi-
gated the impact of the acoustic properties (Exper-
iments 1 and 2) and the semantic properties
(Experiment 3) of task-irrelevant sound on CRAT
problem-solving performance. Experiments 1 and
2 demonstrated a changing-state effect whereby
the presence of changing as compared to repeated
letters (Experiment 1) and tones (Experiment 2) sig-
nificantly impaired CRAT performance regardless of
the difficulty of the problems. In Experiment 3,
meaningful, task-irrelevant sound produced
greater impairment of CRAT performance than
meaningless task-irrelevant sound, which in turn
reduced CRAT performance as compared with
quiet. Again, CRAT difficulty did not modulate this
disruption.
Across Experiments 1 and 2, the presence of
changing-state sound did not affect self-reported
solution strategies (i.e. insight vs. analysis). Exper-
iment 3 gave rise to an interaction between mean-
ingful sound and problem difficulty in relation to
self-reported solution strategies, with only the
difficult problems showing differences in self-
reported strategies across sound conditions in that
more insight-based ratings arose in the meaningful
speech condition compared to the other conditions.
This finding was not in line with our predictions and
is challenging to explain, but it may serve as an
interesting avenue for future research.
We argue that our findings relating to CRAT per-
formance in the face of task-irrelevant sound are
consistent with a generate-and-test account of
CRAT problem solving (Cranford & Moss, 2012;
Smith et al., 2013), whereby candidate responses
are generated via a local search of semantic
memory networks and are then tested against
cue-words for their veracity as solutions. We
suggest that meaningful, task-irrelevant sound pro-
duces activation within the semantic network,
thereby disrupting the spread of activation and
localised search for the solution word. Further, we
argue that this semantic interference effect is quali-
tatively distinct from the disruptive impact that
meaningless, task-irrelevant sound confers to CRAT
problem solving. Inferring from the results of Exper-
iments 1 and 2, we propose that the disruption pro-
duced by meaningless sound is a changing-state
effect. This auditory distraction effect is purportedly
the joint product of pre-attentive processes applied
involuntarily to the sound and to processes under-
pinning the focal task (Jones & Tremblay, 2000).
The cues derived from changes from one sound
element to the next specify the order of those
sounds and this order information specifically inter-
feres with the goal-driven processes of keeping to-
be-remembered items in sequence via the
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deliberate process of serial rehearsal (interference-
by-process). While it is unlikely that serial rehearsal
underpins CRAT performance, at least some verbal
maintenance or subvocal planning may be necess-
ary once a response candidate has been recovered
(from the generation process) to test it against
each cue-word. We assume that this testing
process is susceptible to disruption via the changing
acoustic properties of task-irrelevant sound (i.e. the
changing-state effect).
We consider that the interference-by-process
account is a better explanation of the disruption
produced by changing-state task-irrelevant sound
on CRAT problem solving than an attentional view
(e.g. Bell et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2019; Cowan, 1995;
see also Neath, 2000) for a number of reasons.
According to the attentional view the consumption
of capacity by task-irrelevant sound may surpass the
total available capacity for the focal task at hand. On
this view it would be assumed that changing-state
sound, regardless of whether it conveys semantic
properties, should produce distraction on any
focal task, regardless of the nature of the processing
(semantic or non-semantic) involved in that task.
However, this prediction is not borne out by the
available data. For example, as a class of tasks that
make substantial demands on attention, executive
tasks, should be susceptible to the disruptive
effects of changing-state sound. However, several
lines of evidence suggest that the mere presence
of to-be-ignored sound does not appear to disrupt
executive processing. Morris and Jones (1990)
reported that the presence of articulatory suppres-
sion and meaningless irrelevant speech impaired
serial memory for the items regardless of the
number of updates required. Thus, rehearsal, not
the executive process of updating, was impaired
by irrelevant speech disrupting speech-planning.
A further result at odds with the attentional
account is that changing-state (meaningless) irrele-
vant speech fails to impair semantic fluency (i.e.
the retrieval of category-exemplars to a semantic-
category name such as “fruit”) or phonemic
fluency (i.e. retrieval of words beginning with a
cued first letter; Jones et al., 2012). Given the exten-
sive involvement of executive processing in both of
these fluency tasks (i.e. inhibition, updating and
monitoring of working memory content, self-
initiation, switching between clusters; Baldo et al.,
2006; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Troyer et al., 1998),
these latter findings suggests that changing-state
sounds do not impair such executive processing
(at least those involved in fluency and memory
updating; Jones et al., 2012; Morris & Jones, 1990).
If this conclusion is viable, then the disruption it pro-
duces to CRAT performance in Experiments 1 and 2
cannot be attributable to disruption of the putative
functions of executive processing within the CRAT
(Smith et al., 2013; Storm et al., 2011; but see
Marko et al., 2019) which include, for example, use
of the executive function of inhibition to remediate
repeated solution failures and fixation when a can-
didate word (typically a prepotent response)
coheres with one or even two of the three cue-
words (cross, rain, tie), but not all three (e.g. cross-
walk, raincoat; Storm, 2011; Storm et al., 2011;
Storm & Angello, 2010; Storm & Koppel, 2012).
Thus, we assert that the locus of the disruption pro-
duced by task-irrelevant sound is not at a level
whereby inappropriate responses require inhibition
to enable generation of novel, insightful, solutions
(Gilhooly et al., 2007; Schooler & Melcher, 1995),
but rather due to subvocal planning required in
testing potential solutions.
In the next sections we first consider the possi-
bility that subvocal planning, which is vulnerable
to changing-state disruption, is necessary for sol-
ution testing with CRAT problems. The consider-
ations that then follow deal with the potential
susceptibility of semantic search to disruption via
the automatic semantic processing of meaningful,
task-irrelevant sound.
What role is played by working memory in
solution testing?
If it is assumed that solution testing for CRAT pro-
blems entails working memory, then it is important
to consider the nature of these processes. Unlike
typical working memory tasks, wherein participants
must actively maintain in mind a set of items, the
cue-words for CRAT problems are always present,
which makes it unlikely that a simple capacity con-
straint determines the disruption of CRAT perform-
ance in the presence of task-irrelevant sound
(Jones & Tremblay, 2000). One possibility is that
working memory is required to maintain semantic
representations or multiple meanings of a concept
that are active within the language system (e.g. in
the case of polysemic words). For example, partici-
pants must remember and maintain the meaning
of previously produced words to search locally
within the same semantic space in memory. There
is growing evidence that phonological and
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semantic representations contribute separately to
working memory task performance (Haarmann
et al., 2003; Nishiyama, 2013; Shivde & Thompson-
Schill, 2004). Furthermore, semantic representations
appear to be actively maintained independently
from phonological representations (Nishiyama,
2013, 2018). Earlier we noted that the relationship
between verbal working memory capacity measures
(e.g. OSPAN) and CRAT performance (Chein & Weis-
berg, 2014) might be attributable to covert retrieval
and rehearsal of items during the task (McCabe,
2008). Covert retrieval and rehearsal may be under-
taken by refreshing (Barrouillet et al., 2004), mental
search (Cowan, 1992) or subvocal rehearsal (Badde-
ley, 1986). Therefore, the relationship between
working memory capacity and CRAT performance
could be related to one or more forms of covert
retrieval/rehearsal. However, some theoretical
clarity on this issue can be gleaned from the relative
sparing of attentional refreshing (which arguably
supports semantic activations) under empirical con-
ditions that eliminate or diminish opportunities for
subvocal rehearsal. For example, Nishiyama (2018)
reports a study in which the secondary task of
tapping (which demands attentional resources
involved in refreshing) impaired synonym recog-
nition performance while articulatory suppression
had no effect. Thus, the activation of the semantic
representations of words via long-term memory
networks – via attentional refreshing – can be main-
tained in the presence of articulatory suppression
(Nishiyama, 2018).
That refreshing can occur independently of the
availability of subvocal processing might explain
the pervasive influence that semantic represen-
tations continue to have on short-termmemory per-
formance under conditions of concurrent
articulation (Besner & Davelaar, 1982; Haarmann &
Usher, 2001; Saint-Aubin & Poirier, 1999), while so-
called phonological effects are typically abolished
(Baddeley et al., 1975; Murray, 1968). While it is poss-
ible that attentional refreshing may be involved in
CRAT performance, it is unlikely that it is disrupted
by task-irrelevant sound. This is because only atten-
tionally demanding secondary tasks purportedly
disrupt attentional refreshing (Nishiyama, 2018).
Furthermore, the finding that articulatory suppres-
sion, which does not disrupt attentional refreshing,
impairs CRAT performance (Ball & Stevens, 2009)
implies that reducing the opportunity for speech-
based planning (as is assumed to occur with both
articulatory suppression and task-irrelevant sound),
is unlikely to disrupt the semantic representations
involved in CRAT performance. This suggests that
some mechanism other than subvocal rehearsal
supports the maintenance of semantic represen-
tations within the cognitive system.
Threadgold et al. (2019) have previously argued
that subvocalisation may be required to rehearse
potential solutions during CRAT problem solving
before converging on a solution word. For
example, participants may generate a response can-
didate and use inner speech to test the viability of
that word against the cue-words. In the case of
the CRAT problem “cadet, deep, ship”, participants
may rehearse “space-cadet” and “deep-space”
while testing the validity of the generated word as
a solution against “ship”. Subvocalisation might be
particularly useful in the case of problems for
which the solution word varies as a prefix or suffix
for the cue-words (e.g. “space-cadet” [prefix],
“deep-space” [suffix]), but is perhaps less useful for
RAT problems, where the solution word has
different conceptual relationships to the cue-
words (associative relatedness, synonymy and
compounding).
It is clear that subvocalisation underpins a
number of tasks other than serial recall (Beaman,
2018; Miyake et al., 2004; Smith et al., 1995; for a
review, see Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015). For
example, Smith et al. (1995) report that subvocalisa-
tion plays a role in parsing meaningful letter strings
(“NRG” = Energy) as revealed by susceptibility of the
task to disruption via the mere presence of task-irre-
levant sound or the demand for engagement in
articulatory suppression. The notion here is that
subvocalisation is required so that a judgment can
be based on the auditory imagery it yields.
Perhaps it is possible that processing multiple com-
pound words for their veracity also requires auditory
imagery? An alternative possibility is that task-irrele-
vant sound may impair subvocalisations important
in set shifting (Miyake et al., 2004) and task switch-
ing (Emerson & Miyake, 2003) that may underpin
CRAT performance. However, caution should be
exercised when entertaining this possibility since
putative executive functions appear to be resistant
to disruption via task-irrelevant sound (Jones et al.,
2012) and there is opposition to the view that
CRAT performance requires such functions (e.g.
Marko et al., 2019).
Whilst we have considered changing-state irrele-
vant sound to impact specifically on the subvocali-
sation required for the test process, rather than
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impairing any semantic processing involved in the
task per se, it is possible that semantic represen-
tations could also affect active word maintenance.
For example, articulatory rehearsal of words can
give rise to their lexical-representations that can in
turn feedback to facilitate their articulatory rehear-
sal. Thus, further work is required to establish
whether the impairment to CRAT performance by
task-irrelevant sound is specific to the subvocalisa-
tion process in the absence of semantic processing,
or whether semantic processing is also disrupted
due to the impairment of subvocal rehearsal via
task-irrelevant sound. Assuming the disruption of
CRAT performance by task-irrelevant sound taps a
generation process (Smith et al., 2013; cf. Jones
et al., 2012), it is of import to consider further the
nature of semantic networks and processes therein.
Semantic networks and their robustness or
susceptibility to (semantic) distraction
The classic view of semantic search as a generative
process is that a printed (or heard) word activates
a concept node corresponding to its meaning,
with activation then spreading to concept nodes
that are semantically related. The problem space
for CRAT items is the localised network of semantic
associates activated by the cue-words, one of which
should be the solution word owing to convergent
activation from the cue-words. As the solution
word is a weak associate of the cue-words, its acti-
vation level may be low and thus a goal for the
problem solver is to increase activation of the sol-
ution word relative to other words within the
search space (Davelaar, 2015). The presence of
task-irrelevant sound that also activates the con-
cepts of words within the semantic network (Röer
et al., 2017; Vachon et al., 2020) will reduce the like-
lihood of discovering words associated with the
cue-words by driving down their activation (see
also Jones et al., 2012). This would be particularly
the case for weak associates that receive less acti-
vation than strong (prepotent) associates of one or
more cue-words.
One reason why the disruptive impact of mean-
ingful, task-irrelevant sound observed in Experiment
3 was modest may be due to the considerable varia-
bility between individuals in terms of their semantic
networks (Kenett et al., 2018; Mednick, 1962). For
example, Mednick (1962) proposed that individual
differences in the capability to solve RAT problems
relates to an associative hierarchy that organises
creative ideas. There is considerable variation
between individuals in these lexical-semantic and
associative structures. Individuals with steeper
associative hierarchies connect more closely-
related and fewer distally-related concepts. This
may result in the production of a small number of
frequent or stereotypical ideas or responses. Since
the RAT requires processing uncommon, infrequent
lexical-semantic associates that are distally-related
(remote associates), these individuals are poorer at
RAT problems than those individuals with a flatter
organisation of semantic memory structure who
can combine a wide range of weakly-activated con-
cepts to generate novelty. Therefore, the flatter the
organisation of semantic memory, the greater the
links between concepts, including those that are
remotely associated. Thus, individuals with flatter
organisations of semantic memory can generate a
large variety of associated responses to cue-words,
including remote and uncommon associates. This
is particularly useful in the context of RAT problems,
wherein solutions entail greater remote association
to cue-words.
Similar conclusions have been reached by other
researchers (Kenett et al., 2014; Marko et al., 2019;
Rossmann & Fink, 2010). For example, using seman-
tic-network modelling, Kenett et al. (2018) showed
that the semantic network of highly creative partici-
pants is more spread out and cleaves into more par-
titions than that for low creative participants whose
networks are more rigid. It follows that disruption of
search within a network, as produced by meaning-
ful, task-irrelevant sound might be a function of
each participant’s network. For example, activation
within semantic memory for individuals with steep
associative hierarchies (for which remote associ-
ations are more difficult to activate) might be
more susceptible to disruption via the presence of
meaningful, task-irrelevant sound.
Can the think-aloud technique help delineate
the CRAT processes that are affected by task-
irrelevant sound?
We suggest that the deployment of the think-aloud
technique (e.g. Ball & Stevens, 2009; Chein et al.,
2010; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly et al., 2010;
Schooler et al., 1993; Schooler & Melcher, 1995) is
likely to afford a deeper understanding of the
roles of generate-and-test processes in solving
CRAT problems as well as the susceptibility of
these processes to disruption via the acoustic or
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semantic properties of task-irrelevant sound.
Necessarily, articulatory suppression requires the
use of the vocal-motor production system, thereby
preventing the overt report of candidate items.
However, changing-state, task-irrelevant sound,
whose locus of disruption is arguably also via the
vocal-motor production system (Jones et al., 2004),
does not prevent the vocal production of candidate
responses (Ball et al., 2015). Therefore, assuming
that the think-aloud requirement changes neither
the nature of the generate process (and thus the
response candidates considered) nor the following
testing process (e.g. Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Smith
et al., 2013; Weisberg, 2015; but see Schooler
et al., 1993), then any differential disruption to
these processes produced by the acoustic/semantic
properties of task-irrelevant sound could be
observed. Further, Cranford and Moss (2012) estab-
lished a protocol for identifying the various com-
ponents of insight, including impasse,
restructuring and the “Aha!” experience that, if
adopted, might further characterise the impact of
task-irrelevant sound on the component processes
underpinning CRAT performance.
Similar to the insights into CRAT problem solving
offered by the think-aloud technique, other tasks
involving the production of lexical entries from
semantic memory may likewise permit inspection
of alterations in the search process due to the pres-
ence of meaningful, task-irrelevant sound. For
example, Gupta et al. (2012) requested that partici-
pants produce a single “best guess” for RAT pro-
blems under time pressure. Participants who
produced responses of low associative frequency,
even if incorrect, had better RAT performance than
those who tended to produce high associative fre-
quency (incorrect) responses. If obligatory proces-
sing of task-irrelevant semantic information
impacts on strong and weak linkages differentially,
as one might predict, then it would be expected
that guesses should be higher in associative fre-
quency in the presence of task-irrelevant meaning-
ful speech. This is because concurrent activation
due to the obligatory processing of semantic acti-
vation should cause the activation of weakly-
related items to drop off sooner (Sörqvist et al.,
2010).
One complication for this latter proposal is that
the difficulty of RAT problems, regardless of their
psycholinguistic heterogeneity, is intricately
related to “remoteness”, as defined by the associat-
ive and syntagmatic distance between the cue-
words and the respective solutions. Indeed, Marko
et al. (2019) report that 80% of the variance in
item difficulty is attributable to associative and syn-
tagmatic distance. The upshot of this, is that the
difficulty of RAT items stems from demands on the
lexical-semantic search for remote solution candi-
dates. If meaningful, task-irrelevant sound impairs
activation of particularly uncommon and infrequent
lexical-semantic associates, then it might be pre-
dicted that the disruptive impact of meaningful, as
compared with meaningless, task-irrelevant sound
would be more pronounced for the more difficult
CRAT problems. However, contra to this pattern,
the additional disruption from meaningful as com-
pared with meaningless sound was not more pro-
nounced for easy as compared with difficult CRAT
items. On the face of it, this finding conflicts with
the prediction that meaningful task-irrelevant
sound impairs semantic search, particularly for
weak associates. However, it should be noted that
the difficulty measures used in our study (drawn
from Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b) may not
relate specifically to the semantic remoteness of a
solution and could, therefore, be influenced by
other factors such as the length of the solution or
the size of the problem space in terms of the total
number of compound words that can be generated
from the cue-words (Bowden et al., 2005).
Insight versus analytic processing:
dichotomy and criterial issues
Although self-report ratings for CRAT problems
demonstrated that they were mostly solved via
insight, whether the occurrence of insight is criterial
for classifying a response as creative, as suggested
by some researchers (Ohlsson, 2011; Perkins, 2000;
Wiley & Jarosz, 2012) has been debated (Weisberg,
2015). Moreover, multiple paths may give rise to
insight (Cranford & Moss, 2012; Fleck & Weisberg,
2004, 2013), suggesting that the proposed
sequence to an insight solution (problem presen-
tation → repeated failure → impasse → incubation
→ restructuring → Aha! + solution) also cannot be
criterial or definitive for a creative solution.
The latter observation rather undermines views
that propose that special processes underpin
insight problem solving (e.g. Schooler et al., 1993)
and instead supports a “business-as-usual” view
(cf. Ball & Stevens, 2009), according to which the
cognitive processes underpinning insight and non-
insight problem solving are essentially the same,
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despite subjective experiences accompanying
insight differing from those accompanying analytic
processes. On the business-as-usual view, there
exists a continuum of analytic-to-insight problem
solving rather than a dichotomy of analytic versus
insight processes (but see Gilhooly & Murphy,
2005). If the business-as-usual view is accepted,
then the failure to observe an impact of meaningful
versus meaningless task-irrelevant sound on self-
reported problem-solving strategies is unsurprising.
This is because the processes arguably affected by
the acoustic and by the semantic properties of back-
ground sound will underpin solutions that are self-
reportedly solved through both non-insight and
insight methods.
The cognitive control paradox in the domain
of creative cognition
In this paper we have argued in favour of an interfer-
ence-by-process account of the disruption to CRAT
performance by task-irrelevant sound. We assert
that the impairment produced by changing-state
sound is attributable to the processing of that
sound directly undermining the subvocal proces-
sing necessary for testing candidate solutions.
Further, we ascribe the additional effect of mean-
ingfulness to the semantic processing of irrelevant
information impairing the semantic search under-
pinning the generation of candidate solutions. The
former process appears to be indomitable: the mag-
nitude of the changing-state effect is immune to
manipulations of cognitive control (Hughes et al.,
2013). However, it is not obvious whether semantic
distraction effects can be overridden by the same
cognitive-control manipulations (cf. Marsh et al.,
2012; Vachon et al., 2020). The interference-by-
process account eschews the notion that task-irrele-
vant sound disrupts performance because it cap-
tures attention from any attentionally-demanding
task (Bell et al., 2012, 2019; Cowan, 1995). This
account has been supported by the failure of task-
irrelevant sound to impair executive processing
(Jones et al., 2012; Morris & Jones, 1990) and by
the task-specific nature of distraction (Jones &
Macken, 1993).
If one persists in arguing that task-irrelevant
sound indeed affects controlled attention, then it
is not immediately obvious whether insight
problem solving should benefit or suffer. Several
studies suggest that controlled attention and execu-
tive functions (e.g. mental set-shifting, updating,
monitoring and inhibition) facilitate creative
problem solving (e.g. Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009; Gil-
hooly et al., 2007; Nijstad et al., 2010; Nusbaum &
Silvia, 2011; Benedek et al., 2012; De Dreu et al.,
2012; Edl et al., 2014; Lee & Therriault, 2012; Silvia
et al., 2013). However, this might be contingent
upon whether a solution is obtained via insight or
via analytic problem solving (assuming there is a
distinction; Fleck, 2008; Weisberg, 2015), with
insight processing being less reliant on controlled
attention and executive functions.
Overall, the available data support the latter sug-
gestion (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 2008; Gilhooly &
Fioratou, 2009; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Lavric
et al., 2000). For example, Wiley and Jarosz (2012)
suggest strong executive functions may even
impair insight problem solving due to an increased
focus on obvious solution possibilities limiting
opportunities for restructuring. Further, Jarosz
et al. (2012) suggest that a more diffuse attentional
state arising from mild alcohol intoxication facili-
tates CRAT performance (see also Ansburg & Hill,
2003; Finke et al., 1992; Martindale, 1995).
However, it is unclear how Jarosz et al.’s manipu-
lation makes attention diffuse in this study and no
independent measure of “diffuse attention” was
provided beyond CRAT performance.
If the view is sustained that insight problem
solving is facilitated by reduced controlled attention
and executive processing and that the presence of
task-irrelevant sound usurps resources for such pro-
cessing, then it would be expected that insight, but
not analytic, problem solving should benefit. This
view would imply that CRAT performance should
either increase in the presence of task-irrelevant
sound or that task-irrelevant sound should increase
the likelihood of participants solving the problems
through insightful processing. This pattern of
results, however, was not observed in the current
study.
Does the absence of such findings instead
provide support for the notion that task-irrelevant
sound is more likely to disrupt the goal-directed
processes involved in creative problem solving
that are tied to planning and mental manipulation
(e.g. controlled effortful thinking) rather than the
processes that come about through diffuse acti-
vation that may be underpinned by uncontrolled,
spontaneous, associative thinking (Beaty et al.,
2014; Benedek et al., 2012; Faust & Lavidor, 2003;
Gruska & Necka, 2002; Merten & Fischer, 1999; Ross-
mann & Fink, 2010), assuming both are involved in
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creativity (Gabora, 2010; Mok, 2014)? To sustain this
position, it would have to be assumed that the
spontaneous and automatic activation of semantic
associations does not interact with controlled pro-
cesses (e.g. specifying combinations and con-
straints) to determine CRAT performance (cf.
Chermahini et al., 2012; Jones & Estes, 2015; Lee &
Therriault, 2013).
Conclusions
In conclusion, the findings reported here support
the view that CRAT problem solving is based on a
generate-and-test process. In addition to the
semantic search process, that appears to be dis-
rupted by the presence of meaningful, task-irrele-
vant sound, our findings also point to a role for
subvocalisation in the testing of potential CRAT sol-
utions, which is a process that is impaired by simple
acoustic variation within the task-irrelevant sound.
That these two mechanisms are indeed qualitatively
distinct requires further investigation, as does their
relationship to insight problem solving more gener-
ally. We nevertheless believe that our reported
studies clearly demonstrate the value of studying
the effects of distraction in problem solving as a
way to shed new light on the old issue of under-
standing the component processes that underpin
creative cognition.
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